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RECENT DECISIONS
DIVORCE-ALIMONY-FAULT Is To BE CONSIDERED IN AWARDING
ALIMONY IN AN ABSOLUTE DIVORCE BASED ON FIVE YEARS OF

UNINTERRUPTED SEPARATION-Flanagan v.

Flanagan.,

Flanagan v. Flanagan (Flanagan III), the final case in a trilogy of cases,2 is the first decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals concerning the award of alimony in a no-fault divorce action :' based upon five [now three] years of separation. By its
progression thzough two decisions by the Court of Special Appeals to Maryland's highest court on a grant of certiorari, the case
appears to have gradually and carefully, on the basis of precedent, developed and articulated the standards for awarding alimony under this recently adopted ground for divorce. However,
there are strands in FlanaganIII which augur a radical restructuring of divorce law in Maryland.
The husband had sought divorce on the non-culpatory
ground of five [now three] years of uninterrupted separation.4
1. 270 Md. 335, 311 A.2d 407 (1973).
2. FlanaganI, 14 Md. App. 648, 288 A.2d 225 (1972); FlanaganII, 17 Md. App. 90,
299 A.2d 520 (1973).
3. Divorce a vinculo matrimonii [hereinafter referred to as divorce] is a complete
end to the marriage bond, whereas divorce a mensa et thoro [hereinafter referred to as
legal separation] is a partial or qualified divorce where the parties, though forbidden to
live together, are still married in the eyes of the law. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 566 (rev.
4th ed. 1968). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 24 and 25 for the grounds for divorce and
the grounds for legal separation.
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1973).
Upon a hearing of any bill for a divorce, the court may decree a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii for the following causes, to wit: . . . seventhly, on the application of
either party when the husband and wife have lived separately and apart without
any cohabitation and without interruption for three years. A plea of res adjudicata
or recrimination with respect to any other provisions of this section shall not be a
bar to either party obtaining a divorce on this seventh ground.
This provision became effective as of July 1, 1969. At the time of the Flanagancase, five
years of separation was required, but the required period of separation has been reduced
to three years. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 699, [1973] Md. Laws 1472. For the other nofault provision, based on a voluntary separation agreement, see note 16 infra.
The Court of Special Appeals in Jackson v. Jackson, 13 Md. App. 725, 284 A.2d 654
(1971), listed the three elements constituting this ground of divorce: that the parties shall
have lived separate and apart for five years preceeding the filing of the divorce; that there
has been no cohabitation between them during the period of separation; and that the
separation was without interruption. In Jackson, the court held that the absence of sexual
relations alone will not establish the absence of cohabitation. The court followed the Court
of Appeals' interpretation of similar language in the provision for divorce on the ground
of voluntary separation in Lillis v. Lillis, 235 Md. 490, 201 A.2d 794 (1964), noted in 25
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The case was heard before a master, who recommended that the
divorce be granted but that the wife be denied alimony.5 The
master, apparently assuming that alimony could only be awarded
if the husband were at fault, held that the husband could not be
found at fault in a non-culpatory divorce action.' The circuit
court adopted the master's report. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals in FlanaganI held that the master lacked jurisdiction to hear this contested divorce7 and remanded the case.
In addition, the court discussed other questions for the guidance of the trial court in order to avoid a second appeal.' With
MD. L. REv. 185 (1965). Compare the effect of the wife's adultery on a divorce action based

on five years of separation, discussed in note 32 infra.
5. Mrs. Flanagan filed a cross bill for legal separation on the ground of desertion.
In 1964, the husband had moved from the couple's Garrett County home to Prince Georges
County and began to live with another woman. Mrs. Flanagan, who could no longer work
because of illness, remained in Garrett County. Her husband's monthly support payments
were minimal. After the divorce was granted, see discussion at text accompanying note
10 infra, she began receiving public assistance. 14 Md. App. at 651-52, 288 A.2d at 22829.
6. He had refused to allow the wife to amend her complaint to allege the adultery
of the husband. 14 Md. App. at 650-51, 288 A.2d at 227-28. In addition, the denial of
attorney's fees spurred an appeal by the wife's attorney. 14 Md. at 659, 288 A.2d at 232.
Alimony is not regarded by the Maryland courts as punitive. See Willoughby v.
Willoughby, 256 Md. 590, 593, 261 A.2d 452, 453 (1970); Waters v. Waters, 191 Md. 436,
440, 62 A.2d 250, 252 (1948); Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638, 643, 276 A.2d 425, 427
(1971). Instead, alimony is a recognition of the husband's common law duty to support
his wife. See discussion at note 19 infra. Therefore, the husband's fault should not increase
the award, although any fault on the part of the wife may decrease the award. Thus, when
courts talk of fault as a factor relevant to the award of alimony, they are usually focusing
on the wife's fault. In practice, however, the amount of alimony is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Burton v. Burton, 253 Md. 233, 252 A.2d 472 (1969). The
award will not be changed on appeal unless the Chancellor's discretion was arbitrarily
used, or his judgment was clearly wrong. Willoughby v. Willoughby, 256 Md. 590, 261 A.2d
452 (1970). Thus, it may be difficult to say that the husband's fault did not play a part
in any given award.
7. 14 Md. App. 648, 654, 288 A.2d 225, 229. Jurisdiction was lacking under Rule
§ 80.b(iii) of the Seventh Judicial Circuit because the Rule allowed a referral to the
Master only if there were a pro forma denial. See note 5 supra. This rule was subsequently
revised as of December 1, 1971. Id. at 653 n.1, 288 A.2d at 229 n.1.
8. The discussion of the questions relating to conditions governing the grant of a
divorce and the award of alimony and other questions are actually dicta. The Court also
rejected the use of the doctrine of recrimination as a bar to a divorce on the basis of five
[now three] years of uninterrupted separation, 14 Md. App. at 654-55, 288 A.2d at 230.
In this initial yet crucial ruling, the Court pointed to the provision in article 16, section
24, and drew an analogy to the other no-fault ground for divorce, voluntary separation,
id. The intent of the legislature was claimed to be that the doctrine of recrimination
should be inapplicable. "The legislative purpose ...
was to preclude a party from perpetually preventing his or her spouse from obtaining a decree of divorce ....
" Id.
As a result of this ruling, the court agreed with the Master's refusal to permit the wife
to amend her cross bill to allege adultery and stated that the complaint in the cross bill
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respect to the denial of alimony, the court, rejecting the master's
rationale for the denial of alimony and looking to the legislative
intent, ' held that alimony may be awarded in a divorce based on
the grounds of five [now three] years of uninterrupted separation, since the lack of the husband's fault is irrelevant to either
his or his wife's obtaining that divorce.' The question of whether
the wife's fault should be considered in awarding alimony was not
commented upon by the court, since no evidence of the wife's
fault was presented. The court did say, however, that fault was
one of the factors to be considered in awarding alimony in a nonculpatory divorce."
N,ot anticipating a subsequent appeal by one of the Flanagans, the Court of Special Appeals had an opportunity to clarify
its dicta in FlanaganI. Here, the wife argued that her fault should
not be considered in any determination of the award of alimony
accompanying a divorce action based on five years [now three]
alleging desertion, a ground for legal separation if proven, was unnecessary. However, the
court stated later that proof of either the husband's desertion, adultery, or both, would
be relevant to the determination of alimony, see discussion at note 10 infra.
9. The primary statute used by the court, MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 3 (1973), states:
"In cases where a divorce is decreed, alimony may be awarded." The Court of Special
Appeals also cited MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 5(a) (1973), which states: "In all cases where
alimony or alimony pendente lite and counsel fees are claimed, the court shall not award
such alimony or counsel fees unless it shall appear from the evidence that the wife's
income is insufficient to care for her needs." 14 Md. App. at 656, 288 A.2d at 230 (emphasis
supplied by the court). By reason of this latter provision the court found the intent of the
legislature to be that alimony may be claimed in all cases. However, the two sections of
the statute, read together, refer only to those cases where alimony may be awarded.
The Court of Appeals, in Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, 57 A.2d 804 (1948), held that
alimony may be awarded in a divorce based on voluntary separation. The Court of
Appeals in Foote pointed out that the language of article 16, section 3, was in force when
the voluntary separation ground for divorce was enacted, yet the legislature had made no
exception to the court's power to award alimony. Id. at 180, 57 A.2d at 809.
10. The court further stated that it is patent that the legislature did not intend that
the husband, "at the expiration of five years uninterrupted separation from his spouse,
obtain a divorce, and . . . [if] the wife is impecunious, infirm or unemployed, totally
escape support of the wife and thrust upon the public the burden of providing for his then
former spouse." 14 Md. App. at 658, 288 A.2d at 232. Mr. Flanagan had terminated his
support upon the granting of the divorce, which action forced Mrs. Flanagan to resort to
public assistance, see discussion at note 5 supra.
11. 14 Md. App. at 657, 288 A.2d at 231.
12. 16 Md. App. 143, 294 A.2d 671 (1972), cert. denied, 267 Md. 744 (1972). In
Renner, the husband first sued for a divorce on the fault ground of eighteen months
abandonment and the wife instituted a cross claim for alimony on the grounds of adultery
and desertion. The lower court held that the wife was guilty of abandonment but the
husband was denied a divorce because of his adultery. In turn, the wife was denied
alimony pursuant to a decree of legal separation because of her desertion. Id. at 146, 294
A.2d at 672-73. After the appeal was taken by the wife, the husband sued for a divorce on
the grounds of five years of uninterrupted separation.
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of' uninterrupted separation." The Court of Special Appeals, af-

firming and extending the dicta in Flanagan I, held that the
wife's fault is material to a determination of alimony" and that
"recrimination" is a defense to the award of any alimony.' 5
The court gave three grounds for its holding in Renner. First,

reasoned the court, since the Court of Appeals has held that fault
is considered in an award of alimony in a no-fault divorce based

on voluntary separation," fault should be considered in an award
13. Id. at 159, 294 A.2d at 680. The wife argued that, on the basis of FlanaganI,
her fault should not be considered in a determination of the award of alimony. 16 Md.
App. at 160, 294 A.2d at 680. In rebuttal, the Court of Special Appeals noted its statement
in FlanaganI that "a trial court is empowered to grant alimony to a wife free of fault in
all cases where it is claimed, needed, and where a divorce is decreed." Id. (emphasis
supplied by the court).
14. It is clear that the court was discussing both the application of the doctrine of
recrimination as a bar to the award of any alimony, see note 15 infra, and the consideration
of fault as a factor which lessens the award of alimony. However, these two points are not
always discussed separately. The court seems to be aware of the precise definition of
recrimination: "[Aipplying recrimination, Maryland courts deny a party a divorce and alimony should that party be the wife - who has been guilty of a marital offense of
equal magnitude as that complained of." 16 Md. App. at 158, 294 A.2d at 679. Subsequently, the court indicates some confusion, by stating in one sentence that recrimination
is an available defense, but in the next sentence that "accordingly, the chancellor should
give consideration to the fault which destroyed the home." Id. at 160, 294 A.2d at 680.
Thus, a narrow interpretation of Renner, one plausible in light of its facts (see note 12
supra), is that the holding of the court deals only with the award of alimony when conduct
of either spouse could give rise to a fault divorce, i.e. adultery or abandonment.
Strictly speaking, recrimination is not a defense to alimony since the husband's fault
is not considered in awarding alimony. See note 6 supra. However, in a "recriminatory
situation," such as the Renner case, the wife would have no right to alimony since she is
at fault as well as her husband. Therefore, in saying that recrimination is a defense to
alimony in a divorce based on five [now three] years of separation, the court was making
clear that alimony would not be awarded either where the wife alone was at fault, or where
both the husband and the wife were at fault. See discussion at notes 31-35 infra and
accompanying text.
15. 16 Md. App. at 160, 294 A.2d at 680. The court held that the first decree of
constructive desertion made the doctrine of recrimination operative as a bar to any
alimony. Id. at 161, 294 A.2d at 680-81. A plea of recrimination prevents one spouse from
getting a fault divorce when he or she is also guilty of such fault as would be grounds for
divorce. Courson v. Courson, 208 Md. 171, 174, 117 A.2d 850, 851 (1955). Derivative of
the doctrine of "clean hands," it has been an integral part of a divorce action (which is
under the jurisdiction of the equity court). See Note, Five Years Voluntary Separation as
New Ground for Absolute Divorce, 2 MD. L. REv. 357, 361 (1938). However, recrimination
is not a bar to a voluntary separation divorce, the other no-fault ground for divorce.
Matysek v. Matysek, 212 Md. 44, 128 A.2d 627 (1956). See Note, Recrimination as a Bar
to Divorce on the Ground of Three-Year Voluntary Separation, 17 MD. L. REv. 268 (1957).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1973): "Upon a hearing of any bill for a
divorce, the court may decree a divorce a vinculo matrimonii for the following causes, to
wit: . . . fifthly, when the husband and wife shall have voluntarily lived separate and
apart, without any cohabitation, for twelve consecutive months prior to the filing of the
bill of complaint, and such separation is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation . ... "
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of' alimony in a no-fault divorce based on five [now three] years
of uninterrupted separation. 7 Second, to bolster this analogy between the non-culpatory divorce actions, the court stated that the
legislature, in enacting the five [now three] years uninterrupted
separation ground of divorce, could not have intended for an
adulterous wife to get alimony after living five years with an
"impecunious paramour."'' Third, the court cited Maryland
On the voluntary separation divorce, see Note, Recrimination as a Bar to Divorce on
the Ground of Three-Year Voluntary Separation, 17 MD.L. REV. 268 (1957); Note, Further
on Voluntary Separation as a Ground for Absolute Divorce, 15 MD.L. REV. 261 (1955);
Note, Furtheron Five Years Voluntary Separation as Ground for Absolute Divorce, 7 MD.
L. REV. 146 (1943); Note, Five Years Voluntary Separation as New Ground for Absolute
Divorce, 2 MD.L. REV. 357 (1938); see also 25 MD. L. REv. 185 (1965).
17. The analogy between the two non-culpatory grounds for divorce is unclear, because the cases relied upon by Renner as holding that fault is considered in awarding
alimony in a divorce based on voluntary separation are ambiguous in their disposition of
this issue. Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, 57 A.2d 804 (1948), never specifically holds that
fault is to be so considered. In Foote, the Court of Appeals listed fault as one of the factors
normally considered in awarding alimony, but held that the lower court's decision on
alimony would not be disturbed because there was no evidence that some of the factors
were not considered. Id. at 178, 57 A.2d at 808. The opinion of the Court of Appeals in
Hughes v. Hughes, 216 Md. 374, 140 A.2d 649 (1958), also cited by the court in Renner,
assumed only for the sake of argument that fault may be considered.
The analogy may also be somewhat tenuous because the two grounds for divorce are
based on different legislative purposes. In a voluntary separation divorce, the parties must
mutually agree to separate. Smith v. Smith, 257 Md. 263, 266, 262 A.2d 762, 764 (1969).
However, the five [now three] year uninterrupted separation ground for divorce was
created to encompass the situation in which no agreement is possible. Thus, one spouse
cannot perpetually prevent the other from getting a divorce. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 14 Md.
App. 648, 654, 288 A.2d 225, 230 (1972). Presumably, there is better reason to consider
fault in determining the award of alimony pursuant to a five year separation divorce
action, where there is no agreement, than in the voluntary separation divorce, where there
must be an agreement. A fortiori, fault should be considered in the five [now three] year
separation divorce, since fault is apparently considered in the voluntary separation
divorce.
18. Renner v. Renner, 16 Md. App. at 159-60, 294 A.2d at 679-80. Even if the wife
obtained an agreement so that she could gain a divorce within 12 months, she could not
receive alimony because of her adultery. Flanagan IIIutilizes this legislative intent. See
notes 26-30 infra and accompanying text.
If the wife committed adultery after the five years of separation, but before the
divorce was decreed, she would have no right to alimony since the adultery occurred while
the parties were still married. See Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 129 A.2d 917 (1956),
where the wife's right to receive alimony under a legal separation decree was forfeited
when she committed adultery. See note 3 supra. Thus, alimony awarded under a legal
separation decree may be modified because of a change in circumstances. Clarke v.
Clarke, 149 Md. 590, 131 A.2d 821 (1926). However, the rules change after a decree of
divorce ends the marriage relationship. After a decree of divorce without alimony, a court
will not award alimony unless the court had previously reserved the power to do so.
Marshall v. Marshall, 162 Md. 116, 159 A.2d 260 (1932). In contrast to the Courson case,
the Court of Special Appeals has refused to terminate a wife's alimony under a decree of
divorce even though she had apparently been having sexual relations with another man.
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 281 A.2d 407 (1971).
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cases which show that the husband's common law duty to support
his wife ends with the wife's fault."'
Apparently unaware of the Renner decision, upon remand
the Chancellor, after granting the husband a divorce, refused to
allow the husband to show that the wife's fault had destroyed
their narriage; the Chancellor thus awarded alimony to the
wife.' -" The husband appealed. In Flanagan1121 the Court of Special Appeals held that the fault of the wife is material to the
determination of an award of alimony. The court, following
Renner, focused on the analogy between the two no-fault divorce
actions and on the legislative intent.2" However, the court failed
to discuss the extent to which fault would reduce the amount of
alimony.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to the wife,"' and in
Flanagan1111 affirmed the Court of Special Appeals' broad holding that the wife's fault is material to the determination of an
19. If there is no divorce, the husband's duty to pay for necessaries purchased by
his wife ends when the wife is guilty of desertion, Kerner v. Eastern Hosp., 210 Md. 375,
123 A.2d 333 (1955), or is guilty of adultery, Dudley v. Montgomery Ward, 255 Md. 247,
257 A.2d 437 (1969). A wife who is receiving alimony under a legal separation decree
forfeits her alimony when she is guilty of adultery. Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 129
A.2d 917 (1956).
Although the court in Renner did not elaborate on the rationale behind the Kerner,
Dudley and Courson cases, they are all based on the husband's common law duty to
support his wife. Alimony is a recognition of this duty. Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638,
643, 276 A.2d 425, 427 (1971). MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 88 makes it a misdemeanor for a
husband willfully to neglect to support his wife; the statute does not mention that the
wife's fault is a defense. Both this provision and the common law duty may be in doubt
after the recent ratification of article 46 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution
of Maryland, which provides that "[elquality of rights under the law shall not be
abridged or denied because of sex." See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, Equal Rights
Amendment. A ('Cnstitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 9444(. 951-53 (1971): Weaver, Equal Rights for Women: The Practical Effects, 6 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTS-CIv. LAR.L. REV. 17, 18-19 (1971). The Court ot Special Appeals recently upheld
an award of alimony to a wife over the husband's contention that awarding alimony to
the wife was invalid under this constitutional provision because Maryland law does not
provide for alimony to be paid to husbands. Minner v. Minner, 19 Md. App. 154, 310 A.2d
208 ( 1973).

20. Unlike the master, the Chancellor had jurisdiction. See discussion at note 7
supra.
21. 17 Md. App. 90, 299 A.2d 520 (1973).
22. The Court posed the issue as being whether the fault of the wife should be
considered. Further, as the court immediately stated thereafter, the proposition that
recrimination is not a bar to a no-fault divorce does not answer the question of whether
recrimination is also operative with respect to the determination of alimony. 17 Md. App.
at 94, 299 A.2d at 521. Its subsequent analysis, relying in large part on and rooted in
Renner, shares the confusion and ambiguity of the Renner decision. It should be noted
that the record in Flanagan,unlike that in Renner, does not indicate that the wife was at
fault, although the husband so claimed.
23. 268 Md. 748, 305 A.2d 242 (1973).
24. 270 Md. 335, 311 A.2d 407 (1973).
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award of alimony. First, the court stated that, under Maryland's
divorce statute, the question of the right to alimony is separate
from that of a grant of divorce.25' Then, pointing to cases which
establish that fault should be considered in determining the
award of alimony in a fault divorce action,2" the court stated that,
absent any legislative intent 7 to the contrary, fault should also
be considered in the determination of the award of alimony in a
non-culpatory divorce action2 The addition of the no-fault
grounds for divorce to a fault divorce system, in lieu of a complete
overhaul of that system, as well as the failure of the legislature
to provide that the wife's fault is immaterial to the award of
alimony in a no-fault divorce, indicates the absence of any contrary legislative intent. '
25. Id. at 338, 311 A.2d at 409-10. In Maryland the authority for allowing alimony
is statutory. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 3 (1973): "In cases where a divorce is decreed,
alimony may be awarded." Alimony may be awarded to the wife even though she does
not ask for a divorce. Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 258 Md. 534, 266 A.2d 337 (1970).
26. 270 Md. at 339, 311 A.2d at 410. See, e.g., Timanus v. Timanus, 178 Md. 640,
642, 16 A.2d 918, 920 (1940).
27. The court did not perceive any legislative intent that the award of alimony be
governed by the same standards in both no-fault divorce actions, although the Court of
Special Appeals had dwelt extensively upon a supposed symmetry between the two actions. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
28. 270 Md. at 340-41, 311 A.2d at 410-11. Maryland's divorce statute provides for
both fault and no-fault divorces. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1973). Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Virginia also have a hybrid fault and no-fault divorce system. The
judiciary in these states has reached the same result as that of Flanagan II - that fault
is to be considered in awarding alimony. See Joliffe v. Joliffe, 76 Idaho 95, 278 P.2d 200
(1954); Sandlin v. Sandlin, 289 Ky. 290, 158 S.W.2d 635 (1942); Sachse v. Sachse, 150 So.
2d 772 (La. App. 1963); Smith v. Smith, 216 So. 2d 391 (1968); Guy v. Guy, 210 Va. 536,
172 S.E.2d 735 (1970) (reading Mason v. Mason, 209 Va. 528, 165 S.E.2d 392 (1969), as
having this holding). However, in FlanaganIII, the Court of Appeals found the decisions
of these states of little help to reach a conclusion appropriate for Maryland, because these
decisions depend largely upon the particular wording of their statutes.
In its statute, West Virginia specifically provides that fault may be considered in
awarding alimony in a divorce on a non-culpatory ground. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4 (Supp.
1972): Grounds for divorce.
(a) A divorce may be ordered: . . . (7) Where the parties have lived separate and
apart in separate places of abode without any cohabitation and without interruption for two years, whether such separation was the voluntary act of one of the
parties or by the mutual consent of the parties; and a plea of recrimination with
respect to any other provision of this section shall not be a bar to either party's
obtaining a divorce on this ground. If alimony is sought under the provisions of
section fifteen [§ 48-2-15] of this article, the court may inquire into the question
of who is the party at fault and may award such alimony according to the right of
the matter and such determination shall not affect the right of either party to
obtain a divorce on this ground.
29. 270 Md. at 340-41, 311 A.2d at 410-11 (1973). Iowa and Oregon, which have
abolished all grounds of fault divorce, do not allow fault to be considered in awarding
alimony. See In Re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972), noted in 34 U. Pirr.
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Second, the Court of Appeals attempted to specify, in three
sentences, the extent to which fault reduces the amount of alimony in a no-fault divorce based upon five [now three] years of
separation." In its discussion the court distinguished two situations, each of which would entail different rules for the
determination of the amount of the award. Both rules arguably
represent departures from the standard governing the award of
alimony in a fault divorce action and in a voluntary separation
no-fault divorce action. Thus, the court seems to have introduced
a certain asymmetry between the two no-fault actions.
The first situation involves a wife guilty of adultery or abandonment and a husband free from fault. Here, no alimony may
be awarded to the wife in a fault divorce3 ' or, probably, in a
voluntary separation no-fault divorce. 2 According to the opinion
in FlanaganIII, this rule applies to a no-fault divorce based upon
five [now three] years of separation unless there are "extenuating circumstances," which will arise in "rare instances." The
rationale supplied by the Court of Appeals for applying this standard rule absent unusual circumstances is that adultery and
abandonment are the only culpatory deeds that "the Legislature
has selected by name which either authorize or can ripen into
grounds for a divorce thereby indicating that it considers them
'34
the more heinous of the acts which can terminate a marriage.
But the Court of Appeals has added a novel qualification to that
standard rule, a qualification recognized by no prior Maryland
cases: "extenuating circumstances.""a
L. REV. 486 (1973), and ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.036(3). Florida has abolished all grounds
of fault divorce, although the adultery of a spouse must be considered in awarding alimJnv. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (Supp. 1973).
30. 270 Md. at 341-42, 311 A.2d at 411.
31. The wife is barred from obtaining a divorce.
32. Cf. Hughes v. Hughes, 216 Md. 374, 140 A.2d 649 (1958), Foote v. Foote, 190
Md. 171, 57 A.2d 804 (1948).
33. 270 Md. at 341, 311 A.2d at 411.
34. Id.
35. A local physician has described an example of extenuating circumstances:
A couple had been married for thirteen years and had four children. They were
people of high society, with reasonable affluence on both sides of the family, but
especially so on the part of the husband. After each pregnancy the wife suffered a
marked state of depletion and had considerable difficulty regaining her strength.
After the fourth child she was in such a state of debilitation that I was asked to see
her for rehabilitation. She made a rapid and rather spectacular response to treatment and I received several very complimentary letters from the husband acknowledging this help. She soon confided to me that in the thirteen years of marriage
she had never once experienced a sexual orgasm, and this despite the fact that
intercourse was frequent-sometimes as often as four times a day. However, be-
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The second situation described in FlanaganIII contemplates
fault on the part of both spouses." Evidently, the Court of Appeals does not elevate their fault to the status of an absolute bar
to an award of alimony.:" However, the court's articulation of the
rule governing the extent to which alimony may be awarded in
this situation is unclear. As stated by the Court of Appeals,
If'
there exists [culpability causing separation] other than
adultery or abandonment on one side, or fault on both sides
which caused the separation of the parties, the chancellor
should consider the parties' degree of blame as well as their
cause of the animal-like character of the action-apparently without feeling and
consideration for her response-she never reached a climax. She asked in a plaintive sort of'
way if I thought there ever would be a time when she could gain some
sat isfact ion from the act. I replied that I felt it might be possible, but not with this
partner under the circumstances she described. I did not know at the time she asked
this question that she was already contemplating making this test with another
partner and that some plans had been in the making for about six months. Apparently during this planning stage the husband had intercepted some telephone conversations. In any case, he knew about the planned meeting and was in the lobby
of the hotel with his lawyer when his wife and her paramour walked out after what
she described as three hours of fantastic response. The husband immediately blew
up in righteous indignation, put her out of the house and vowed that she would get
none of the assets of their relationship.
When this case was brought before the judge he agreed with me (as her physician) that there were extenuating circumstances in this situation and that the wife
had been driven from her bed by an unconscionable husband who used her for his
own benefit without concern in any way for her response and wellbeing.
This woman was a good mother and a good wife, but was forced to wonder after
thirteen years of violent sexual acrobatics as to why she did not respond and obtain
any enjoyment from this relationship. She naturally became disenamoured and
began to wonder whether her own femininity was at fault. With the first testing of
this hypothesis she found out that she was capable and able to respond, but not to
the man to whom she was married-who had been anything but a good teacher and
considerate partner to her sexual life.
Under such circumstances I believe the woman should not be held at fault and
should not be denied her share of the estate she helped to accumulate-and under
no circumstances should be denied the right to have her children. In the disposition
of this case the judge awarded the children to this mother. He also awarded a very
large contribution for their welfare and education, which was sufficient for the
mother to maintain a home for them and herself. I felt that this was a good settlement of this case.
An interesting footnote to this case is that this man has married twice since
this divorce, and has been divorced by both the new wives. It is rumored that he
had been called a 'beast' by them also.
In this case we have the unusual fact that our primary decision has been
corroborated by subsequent facts.
Letter to the Maryland Law Review, Dec. 12, 1973 (on file at the Review, 500 West
Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201).
36. 270 Md. at 341-42, 311 A.2d at 411.
37. Id.
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relative guilt in those cases where applicable and, in conjunction with the factors quoted earlier in this opinion, decide upon the proper award."'
This rule purportedly comprehends three instances of mutual
fault: mutual adultery or abandonment; mutual fault of a lesser
degree; and adultery or abandonment on the part of one spouse
and fault of a lesser degree on the part of the other spouse.
Where mutual adultery or abandonment exist, the doctrine
of recrimination bars a fault divorce" but does not bar either of
the no-fault divorces." Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has
held that a "recriminatory situation" bars the award of alimony
in a voluntary separation divorce.4' On the basis of this precedent,
the Court of Special Appeals in Renner v. Renner 2 and in
Flanagan II' : reached the same result with regard to the award of
alimony in a five [now three] year separation divorce action.
However, a rejection of the Renner and FlanaganII holdings is
implicit in the direction of the Court of Appeals in FlanaganIII
that "the chancellor should consider the parties' degree of blame
as well as their relative guilt . . . ."I The court's language indicates that there is a meaningful distinction between the terms
"blame" and "guilt." 4" Since "guilt" is often used to describe
adulterous conduct or abandonment," the Court of Appeals appears to be permitting the award of alimony to an adulterous
38. Id.
39. This doctrine is operative if the spouse moving for the fault divorce has committed an offense such as adultery or abandonment which would give rise to a cause of action
for divorce against him by the defendant spouse. See, e.g., Matakieff v. Matakieff, 246
Md. 23, 226 A.2d 887 (1967). See also discussion at note 15 supra.
4J. MD.ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1973) states in part that recrimination does
not bar a divorce in an action based on five [now three] years of separation. Previously,
in Hughes v. Hughes, 216 Md. 374, 140 A.2d 649 (1958), the Court of Appeals held that,
the inherent no-fault nature of the voluntary separation action precludes the possibility
that any weight should be given to fault either as a factor favoring or barring a grant of
divorce on that basis, despite the absence of an explicit direction in a statute that the
doctrine of recrimination is inapplicable.
41. Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, 57 A.2d 804 (1948); Hughes v. Hughes, 216 Md.
374, 140 A.2d 649 (1958).
42. 16 Md. App. 143, 159-60, 294 A.2d 671, 679-80.
43. 17 Md. App. 90, 94-96, 299 A.2d 520, 521-22.
44. 270 Md. at 341-42, 311 A.2d at 411 (emphasis added).
45. Fault means both "adulterous" acts or those acts of a lesser nature. The use of
"guilt" and "blame" in the quoted passage is a specification of the generic term "fault."
46. See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960); Meeks v. Meeks,
189 Md. 80, 54 A.2d 334 (1947). Indeed, the Timanus decision, 178 Md. 640, 642, 16 A.2d
918 (1940), which the Court of Appeals cited in Flanagan III as the leading authority for
the rule that the Chancellor is to consider fault in determining the award of alimony, 270
Md. at 339, 311 A.2d at 410, involved a legal separation, rather than a fault divorce action.
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wife, if for example, her adultery is less than that of the husband.
The holding of the court in this context is a departure from the
law governing fault divorce actions and voluntary separation divorce actions, 17 and it is not a logical departure. The husband who
heretofore did not have to support his wife despite his inability
to obtain a fault divorce or legal separation by reason of the
doctrine of recrimination should not be forced to support her after
severance of the marriage bond in a five [now three] year separation no-fault divorce action."'
The Court of Appeals in FlanaganIII was apparently unaware of the implications of its opinion, for the case was simply
remanded to the lower court for a determination of the wife's
fault. Consequently, the language of the court may precipitate
reaction by the General Assembly to codify the rules which it
determines are proper in this area of Maryland divorce law. At
that point, the legislature should consider the resolution of the
tensions inherent in a hybrid fault, no-fault divorce system whose
appended standards for the award of alimony are based on fault
to some uncertain extent.
47. See discussion and cases cited at notes 39 to 41 supra. Recrimination as a
doctrine that bars a fault divorce automatically bars alimony pursuant to that decree. See
Stein v. Stein, 251 Md. 300, 302, 247 A.2d 266, 267 (1968).
48. See second sentence of note 47 supra. In the other two instances of mutual fault,
the Court of Appeals provides a spouse a remedy parallel to the voluntary separation
divorce action.
Where there is mutual fault of a degree lesser than adultery or abandonment, the
spouses could obtain a no-fault divorce on the basis of voluntary separation; the accompanying award of alimony would be determined, in part, by consideration of this mutual
fault. A fault divorce could not be obtained because none of the statutory grounds exist
in this instance of mutual fault.
With respect to the existence of adultery or abandonment on the part of one spouse
and fault less than adultery or abandonment on the part of the other spouse, there are
differing consequences if the husband or the wife has acted in one or the other manner.
Where the wife is guilty of adultery or abandonment, there could be a voluntary separation
divorce action taken by her. However, she would not receive any alimony in that situation
because of the acceptance by the judiciary of the common law principle that any adultery
on her part bars alimony. The same result is reached under Flanagan IlI, but for a different
reason: the inevitable outcome of the FlanaganIII process is that her adultery will outweigh the fault of her husband, to her detriment. Where the husband is guilty of adultery
or abandonment, the husband can not sue for a fault divorce, but he can sue for a divorce
on the basis of voluntary separation. The wife can sue for either type of divorce action. If
either party sues under the action available to him or her, the wife's fault will be considered in mitigation of the award of alimony. In this instance, the weighing process of
FlanaganIII results in the same, or a similar, determination of the amount of the award
of alimony.

CHARITIES-EMPLOYEE OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTION NOT ENTITLED TO RAISE THE DEFENSE OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY IN TORT AcTION AGAINST HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL-Wood v.

A bell.'

In July of 1970, Glen Wood, general manager of the St.
Mary's Fair Association, hired Francis Abell as a general handyman' to assist in preparations for the annual Fair,3 which was due
to open in two weeks. Shortly afterward, Wood, who was installing fence posts with Abell, got off of his tractor with the engine
running. Either he had failed to disengage the tractor gears,
or he kicked the tractor into gear as he dismounted; consequently,
the tractor backed over Abell, who very shortly thereafter died of
the injuries sustained. Abell's survivors brought suit for wrongful
death against both Wood and the Fair Association.'
Both Wood and the Fair Association raised the defense of
charitable immunity ' and challenged the allegations of negligence against Wood. The trial court granted the defense of chari1. 268 Md. 214, 300 A.2d 665 (1973).
2. Initially, the trial court determined that Wood's job qualified as "casual employment" under Maryland's Workman Compensation provisions, MD. ANN. CODE art. 101,
§ 67 (1964). These provisions limit the amount recoverable for the wrongful death of an
ordinary employee but do not limit the amount recoverable for the death of a casual
employee. The Court of Appeals, affirming on this issue, relied on Maryland precedent
which categorized the employment on the basis of, inter alia, the length of service, the
type of service undertaken, and the nature of the employment relationship. 268 Md. at
223, 300 A.2d at 670. See East v. Skelley, 207 Md. 537, 114 A.2d 822 (1955); Moore v.
Clark, 171 Md. 39, 187 A. 887 (1936); Marvil v. Elliot, 164 Md. 659, 165 A. 822 (1933);
Yelton v. Higgins, 13 Md. App. 599, 284 A.2d 857 (1971).
3. In Maryland State Fair v. Supervisor, 255 Md. 574, 172 A.2d 132 (1961), the Court
of Appeals held that local fairs are charitable institutions for the purposes of immunity
from liability in tort.
4. The Association's liability as an employer depended upon the application of the
doctrine of vicarious liability and upon the non-application of the fellow servant rule. The
trial court decided both questions in favor of the plaintiff, and these rulings were affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The court held that Wood was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident, 268 Md. at 228, 300 A.2d at 673, and that the
vice-principal exception to the fellow servant rule applied to the Association's liability.
Id. at 239, 300 A.2d at 678.
5. In Maryland, as the result of two statutory provisions, charitable immunity in
many situations is partial immunity if the charity is sued in tort. The first provision, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 43, § 556A (1971), provides that a hospital or related institution which is
insured against liability for negligence or any other tort in the amount of $100,000 or more
shall not be liable for damages in excess of that insurance coverage. The second provision,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 480 (1971), provides that any charitable institution which
carries insurance must have a clause in its insurance policy which estops the insurance
company from denying liability on the basis of charitable immunity. The latter statutory
provision has been cited by the Court of Appeals as a manifestation of a legislative intent
that charitable immunity, if limited (the charity is not obligated to procure insurance),
is limited only to the extent indicated by the statute. State v. Arundel Park Corp., 218
Md. 484, 147 A.2d 427 (1959).
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table immunity to both defendants against recovery beyond the
limit of their liability insurance. Subsequently, the jury returned
verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them damages
totalling $35,000. The defendants appealed, and the plaintiffs, on
cross-appeal, alleged that the extension of the partial defense of
charitable immunity to Wood, an individual employee of the
charity, was error.' The Court of Appeals held that the defense
of charitable immunity is not available to an individual employee
of a charity who commits a tort in the course of his employment
and who is sued as an individual.
The doctrine of charitable immunity is in Maryland primarily a creature of judges and history. The first Maryland case on
the subject was Perry v. House of Refuge.' The rule in Perry is
simply that "if charity trustees are guilty of a breach of trust, the
person thereby injured has no right to be indemnified by damages
out of the trust fund." 8 This was the initial articulation of what
has come to be known in most jurisdictions, and in Maryland, as
the "trust fund theory" of charitable immunity from tort liability.9
The historical basis of the "trust fund theory" was that most
charitable organizations'" were created or sustained by charitable
6. The plaintiffs did not appeal the trial court's grant of charitable immunity to
the Fair Association for two reasons. First, the State Fair Association did not reveal the
extent of its insurance coverage, and technically the doctrine of charitable immunity
applied totally to the Association. Second, the Court of Appeals has continually stated
that the role of the judiciary in fashioning a doctrine of partial charitable immunity is
negligible. Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d 863 (1968).
7. 63 Md. 20 (1885). The Perry case and McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
120 Mass. 432 (1876), are the earliest American cases dealing with the doctrine of charitable immunity. Both are based on a British case, Feoffees of Heriots General Hospital v.
Ross, 12 C & F 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1208 (1846). The Heriot Hospital decision was overruled
by Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
8. 63 Md. at 26.
9. Another theory is that a charity is not liable for the torts of its employees under
the doctrine of respondeat superior since the basis of the latter doctrine is that an employer should assume the liability of those who work for his profit. The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot apply because employees of a charity are engaged in non-profit
activities. A third theory is that one who accepts the benefits of a charity must be deemed
to have accepted the risk of negligent action by the charity's employees. Less than half
the states have abolished charitable immunity completely. The majority of the forty-seven
states in which charitable immunity was instituted, either judicially or legislatively, have
modified the doctrine in a manner very similar to Maryland. Howard v. Bishop Byrne
Council Home, 249 Md. 233, 237-38, 238 A.2d 863, 865-66 (1968).
10. Most of the cases involving charitable immunity from tort liability concern
hospitals. Originally, all hospitals were run by charitable bequests, and all the patients
were treated without charge. Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, 249 Md. 233, 239,
238 A.2d 863, 865-66. However, the advent of public hospitals and "paying patients" did
not cause the courts to change their stance on the issue of charitable immunity.
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bequests which were in turn administered by trustees. Any payment of money by the trustees for their own negligence or the
negligence of those for whom they were vicariously liable" would
be a use of the trust funds for which the funds were not intended.
In other words, the trustees would be paying for such negligence
out of the funds of the trust. Through the fiction of compliance
with the trustor's intention, the theory of the trust fund dictated
that the charitable organization should remain immune from tort
liability in order to guarantee that the funds remain intact. Practically, this meant that the funds of the trust would be protected
despite the injury to an innocent third party by the misfeasance
of a trustee or one for whom the organization was vicariously
liable.
The Perry rule has been consistently applied and upheld by
the Maryland courts. In Loeffler v. Sheppard-PrattHospital the
Court of Appeals specifically referred to the "trust fund theory"
of Perry. Later, in Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital
the Court of Appeals, citing both Perry and Loeffler, acknowledged that "the principle that charitable corporations are free
from tort liability has long been a basic part of the law of this
state."' The court in Howard refused to overrule Perry, because
the legislature had not chosen to do so and instead had "accepted5
the doctrine . . . and dealt with the matter in its own fashion."'
In Cornelius v. Sinai Hospital" the Court of Appeals upheld
Perry, because to do otherwise would have been "judicial legislation" in direct contradiction to "the legislative policy established
by Code (1957), Article 48A, Section 85."'' In the end the court,
leaving the problem to the legislature, claimed that judicial restraint prevented the court from overturning a law upon which
the legislature had given at least a partial stamp of approval. 8
However, in almost all of the cases in which charitable organizations received charitable immunity from tort liability, the primary issue has concerned the application of charitable immunity
11. The opinion in Perry notes that the doctrine of respondeat superior was gaining
acceptance in the courts. 63 Md. at 22-23.
12. 130 Md. 269, 100 A. 301 (1917).
13. 191 Md. 617, 62 A.2d 574 (1949).
14. Id. at 618, 62 A.2d at 575.
15. Id. The Court was referring to MD.ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 480 (1971); see 191
Md. at 620, 62 A.2d at 575.
16. 219 Md. 116, 148 A.2d 567 (1959).
17. Id. at 117. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 85 (1957), enacted as ch. 900, § 1 [1947]
Md. Laws 2161, is the direct ancestor of the present article 48A, § 480 (1971).
18. 219 Md. at 117, 148 A.2d at 568.
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to those organizations. Never, prior to the present case, has the
Maryland Court of Appeals actually considered extending the
cloak of charitable immunity to a negligent employee of a charitable organization which is entitled to assert the defense." The
policy considerations supporting the "trust fund theory" are not
persuasive when an individual seeks to invoke the doctrine to
prevent his own liability. The funds of the trust would be unaffected if an officer or employee were forced to pay out of his own
pocket. Hence, the trust fund is not endangered by any recovery
from him individually. In fact, dicta in the cases which have
decided the more general question of corporate charitable immunity indicate that recovery from an individual officer was acceptable to the judges who authored and interpreted the trust
fund theory."'
There is but one other reported case to have decided the
precise question raised in Wood v. A bell. In Hill v. President and
Trustees of Tualatin Academy and Pacific University2 the Supreme Court of Oregon, ruling on an almost identical fact situation, held that
though an action may be maintained against an officer, servant or employee of a charitable institution to recover damages for an injury caused by the act or omission of such
person, the action must be against him in his individual and
not in his corporate capacity, so that, if a recovery is
2
awarded, it will not be discharged from the trust funds.1
The Oregon court thus reached the same conclusion as that of the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Wood.
In Wood v. Abell, the Court of Appeals was not called upon
to affirm or to overrule the doctrine of charitable immunity. If
presented with the opportunity to overrule the doctrine, the
Court of Appeals again will probably defer to the legislature.
19. In Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 196 A.2d 887 (1964), the Court of Appeals noted
that the immunity of public officers from liability in tort is based upon different considerations than those behind governmental immunity from liability in tort. Furthermore, the
court stated that if there is no allegation of the negligence of the State, the individual
State official could not defend on the basis of governmental immunity. However, Eliason
was not decided on grounds of immunity.
20. The Woods opinion states this at 268 Md. at 242, 300 A.2d at 678, citing Howard
v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d 863 (1968).
21. 61 Or. 190, 121 P. 901 (1912). The defendant in this case was the president of
the legislatively designated charitable institution. He was joined in the suit, individually,
because of his negligence in the placing of gopher guns about the campus. Plaintiffs argued
successfully on appeal that the grant of charitable immunity to the defendant was error.
22. Id. at 905, citing 12 C & F 507, 513.
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However, in this case of first impression, the Court refused to
expand the doctrine as a defense to the individual liability of a
negligent employee.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-STANDING

OF MEMBERS OF CON-

GRESS TO CHALLENGE EXECUTIVE ACTION IN THE WAR IN INDO-

CHINA-Mitchell V. Laird.I
In 1971, thirteen members of the House of Representatives
brought an action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction
against the War in Indo-China against the President,2 the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the United States of America.
Suing as individuals and as members of Congress, the plaintiffs3
claimed that the defendants and their predecessors had usurped
the power of Congress to determine "whether the United States
should fight a war." 4
The district court dismissed the action against the President,
on the authority of Mississippi v. Johnson,' and against the other
defendants, on the authority of Luftig v. McNamara. The Court
1. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J.; Tamm, J.; and Wyzansky, Senior
United States District Judge of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation);
MacKinnon, J., filed a dissent from the denial of a rehearing en banc.
2. The omission of the President's name from the case's caption was not explained
by the court.
3. The plaintiffs were: Rep. Parren J. Mitchell (D., Md.), Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D., Mass.), Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.), Rep. Bella S. Abzug (D., N.Y.),
Rep. Phillip Burton (D., Calif.), Rep. Herman Badillo (D., N.Y.), Rep. William Clay (D.,
Mo.), Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D., N.Y.), Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D., Mich.), Rep. Charles
C. Diggs, Jr. (D., Mich.), Rep. Charles B. Rangel (D., N.Y.), Rep. Thomas M. Rees (D.,
Calif.), and Rep. Louis Stokes (D., Ohio).
4. 488 F.2d at 613.
5. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867). In this case, the State of Mississippi had demanded
an injunction to prevent President Andrew Johnson from enforcing a congressional reconstruction act passed over the President's veto. Mississippi claimed that the Court could
compel the President to refrain from enforcing the statute. The Court held however, that
the enforcement of an act of Congress was a political rather than a ministerial function of
the Presidency and that, therefore, the Court had no power to interfere with the executive
branch's enforcement of federal legislation. Thus, the case was taken out of the dictum
in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that the appropriate court could
compel executive officials to perform ministerial acts.
6. 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967). In Luftig, the court
flatly declared that the constitutionality of the War in Indo-China raised a political
question beyond the court's jurisdiction. Plaintiff, a member of the Army, sued the Secretarv of) Dcfense and the Secretary of the Army to enjoin them from ordering him to proceed to Vietnam or to its immediate area to engage in the War in Vietnam. The district
(-ourt( posed the issue as being "basically ... whether the courts have any power to enjoin
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, affirming the
dismissal, held that the President was obligated to end an unconstitutional war, as well as to safeguard the interests of the nation.
Since the President has a large measure of discretion in reconciling these obligations, judicial inquiry was inappropriate.7
Before reaching this issue, however, the court of appeals had
to decide whether individual congressmen had standing to bring
the action. The district court did not discuss standing. On appeal,
the plaintiffs claimed that they had standing because the President's policies infringed upon their right as congressmen "to decide whether the United States should fight a war." 8 Although the
Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' basis for standing, the
court accorded to the plaintiffs standing to challenge the President on the basis of their duty to consider impeachment of government officials.'
Standing is an element of the "Case" and "Controversy"
requirement imposed by the United States Constitution" and, as
such, is a prerequisite for federal jurisdiction." The essence of
standing is that the plaintiff, by providing the sharpest possible
the Commander- in-Chief of the Army and Navy . . . against either carrying on a war or
... The district court cited Mississippiv. Johnson and other
hostilities of other types.
authorities as illustrative of the general proposition that federal courts are hesitant to
interfere with executive prerogative, largely out of fear of government by the judiciary.
252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1967). On appeal, the court characterized the lower court's
analysis as being eminently correct, but also stated that the Congress, as well as the
President, is vested with the prerogative to determine the conduct of foreign policy and
the conditions for the exercise of the nation's military power. 373 F.2d at 666.
7. In reaching this result, two of the three judges who heard the appeal rejected the
reasoning of Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971), which held that Congress
had approved the President's actions by appropriating war funds and by extending the
draft. 488 F.2d at 615. Further, these two judges noted that the court would not allow the
President to act in bad faith but then stated that a plaintiff could not obtain facts to prove
such a claim of bad faith. Judge Tamm was content to follow Massachusettsv. Laird and
did not reach the issue of the President's obligations. 488 F.2d at 615.
In addition, the court decided two lesser issues. First, it held that the case had not
been rendered moot by the Vietnam ceasefire signed in January 1973. Second, the court
ruled that the action against the United States was properly dismissed by the district
court on the ground of sovereign immunity.
8. 488 F.2d at 614.
9. Id. Although Mitchell v. Laird presents interesting questions concerning the political question area, this Recent Decision will only treat the issue of standing.
10. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority; . . . to Controversies to which, the
United States, shall be a party;-to Controversies between two or more
States . . ..
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
11. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
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presentation of issues, is the proper person to ensure genuine
adverseness."2 In the vast majority of cases the plaintiff's standing
is uncontested because he has been injured, either physically or
economically, and is therefore the only appropriate person to litigate the dispute. Where the injury to the plaintiff is slight 3 or
indirect," standing often becomes an issue. This situation frequently arises in public actions' where citizens challenge government programs not aimed at them directly.
For many years, the issue of standing in public actions was
controlled by Frothingham v. Mellon. 6 In that case a taxpayer
challenged the constitutionality of an act of Congress which provided for federal funding of state projects to reduce infant and
maternal mortality. The Supreme Court held that, in order to
invoke the judicial power, the plaintiff must show that he "has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of . . . enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.""7 The fact that a citizen's tax bill might be increased as a
result of extra spending was held not to be a direct injury conferring standing to challenge a federal program.
This restrictive attitude toward standing in public actions
remained for many years, until Baker v. Carr" relaxed the requirement of direct injury. In Baker, voters challenged the failure
of the Tennessee legislature to reapportion itself since 1901; the
plaintiffs lived in counties which had become under-represented
under the old law. The Supreme Court held that these voters had
the requisite standing to challenge the inaction of the legislature.
The Court expanded the notion of direct injury to include mere
"debasement" of a vote, rather than the total deprivation which
had previously been required. 9 In redefining direct injury, the
12. Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.
Baker v. Carr, :169 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
13. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
14. E.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
15. A public action was defined by Justice Harlen as one where the plaintiffs were
-indistinguishable from any group selected at random from among the general population .... " Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-20 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
16. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
17. Id. at 488.
18. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
19. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Colegrove v. Green' 328 U.S.
546 (1946).
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Court loosened Frothingham'srestriction against public actions.
The relaxing of Frothingham's restriction on standing in
public actions continued with Flast v. Cohen ° in which taxpayers' suits were sanctioned for the first time. Plaintiffs had sought
to enjoin the expenditure of funds appropriated by Congress to
aid parochial schools under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.21 It was alleged that the expenditure of funds
for such a purpose violated the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the first amendment.2
While paying lip service to the barrier set up in Frothingham
against taxpayers' suits, the Flast v. Cohen decision carved out a
broad exceptioi to it. The Court established a two-pronged test
for determining whether the proper "nexus" existed "between the
status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated. 2 3 First,
the taxpayer is required to show that his status is logically related
to the type of enactment challenged; if an act of Congress were
under challenge, it had to have been passed pursuant to the taxing and spending clause of the United States Constitution." Second, the plaintiff "must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated
''
to Congress by Art. I, § 8. 25
Flast v. Cohen involved an area of decision in which the
taxpayer was the only effective source of challenge to legislative
20. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
21. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241 et seq., §§ 821 et seq. (1970).
22. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
"U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. 392 U.S. at 102. The Supreme Court noted that the question of standing is
related to whether the dispute will be presented in an adversary context and that a
taxpayer may or may not have the requisite personal stake in the outcome.
24. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common defense and general Welfare of the
United States ....
" U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8.
25. 392 U.S. at 102-03. Evidently, the rationale of the Court is that the plaintiff has
the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the litigation because of his interest as a
taxpayer that Congress not spend tax money for programs which breach specific restrictions on congressional power. See 392 U.S. at 103, 105, 106: "[W]henever such specific
limitations are found, we believe a taxpayer will have a clear stake as a taxpayer in
assuring that they are not breached by Congress." The existence of a specific limitation
will by itself narrow the realm of possible resolution. In addition, the Court distinguished
Frothingham. In Frothingham,the plaintiff merely asserted that Congress did not have
the power to appropriate funds for the purpose of aiding the states in carrying out state
responsibilities. Thus, she "failed to make any additional claim that the harm she alleged
resulted from a breach by Congress of the specific constitutional limitations imposed upon
an exercise of the taxing and spending power." Id. at 104.
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action, an area rather narrow in its scope.26 Nevertheless, plaintiffs challenging the War in Indo-China have attempted to gain
standing to challenge the War by using Flast's reasoning. Failing
that, they have relied on the more traditional notion of standing
to sue.27
In Velvel v. Nixon,28 a citizen-taxpayer attempted to use the
rationale in Flast v. Cohen as a basis for his standing to challenge
the War. The taxpayer's argument was that Congress had illegally approved continued funding of the War, since war had not
been declared. Rejecting the plaintiff's particular contention, the
Tenth Circuit held that a taxpayer had no standing to challenge
war appropriations, because they were approved pursuant to the
power to raise armies rather than the power to tax and spend
generally. 2 Since Flast allowed taxpayers to challenge only those
programs passed pursuant to the general taxing and spending
power, Flast was inapposite in this case.
In Gravel v. Laird,3" twenty-two members of Congress, asserting standing under both Flast and the more traditional "direct injury" formulation, challenged the President's authority to
prosecute the War in Indo-China in general and the bombing and
mining of Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam in particular.
Relying on Velvel v. Nixon, the District Court for the District of
26. Justices Stewart and Fortas, in concurring opinions in Flast, expressed the belief
that the decision should be limited to first amendment restrictions on the taxing and
spending power. 392 U.S. at 114, 115.
27. As explicated in Baker v. Carr and in Frothinghamv. Mellon.
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the direct injury
requirement is very much alive. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the Sierra
Club, in a suit against the Secretary of the Interior, claimed standing by virtue of the fact
that the Club was interested in environmental matters. The Supreme Court held that
concern was not enough. Only those persons demonstrably affected by the Secretary's
actions had the standing to challenge them.
In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court held that Army surveillance of civilian
dissident groups could not be challenged merely because of the "chilling" effect such
activities might have on those who feared surveillance.
28. 415 F.2d 236, 238-39 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
29. Id. at 238-39. The plaintiff conceded that the basis of his suit was not a challenge
to the power of Congress to tax for the Vietnam War under the taxing and spending clause.
Rather, he asserted that there is no meaningful distinction between attacking the Congress on that basis, which as a taxpayer he allegedly had standing to do, and attacking
the President's usurpation of the power to declare war. In addition, the plaintiff claimed
that a necessary and sufficient requirement of standing is only that he have a personal
stake in the outcome of the litigation. The court rejected this claim on two grounds: The
plaintiff was no different from any other citizen plaintiff; and to disregard the rationale
of standing articulated in Flast and prior cases, even though the taxpayer may have a
personal stake, would result in a multitude of suits against every congressional or executive action.
30. 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972).
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Columbia ruled flatly that Flast v. Cohen could not be used to
gain standing to challenge the War." Further, in answer to plaintiffs' attempt to gain standing by the traditional approach, the
court ruled that the congressmen had not "shown sufficiently
that the action they challenge has caused them individually 'injury in fact.' "32
Against this background, the plaintiffs in Mitchell apparently asserted a direct injury from the President's usurpation of
their alleged right as members of Congress to decide exclusively
whether the United States should conduct a war.33 Thus, they
attempted to show that the President's actions in Indo-China had
affected their powers and rights in much the same manner as the
Tennessee legislature had affected the voter-plaintiffs in Baker v.
Carr. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs' claim .3The fact that some types of hostili31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. The plaintiffs alleged.standing to sue both as congressmen and as citizentaxpayers. The court rejected both of plaintiffs' assertions, but did not explain whether
there were any differences or similarities between the two.
In Mitchell v. Laird, the court accorded standing without mentioning the possible
hurdle presented by Gravel. The only difference between the two cases regarding standing
was that in Gravel two plaintiffs were senators, while in Mitchell all were members of the
House of Representatives.
Cf. Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972), where standing to challenge the
War in Indo-China on the basis of direct injury was denied. A group of army reservists
had challenged the constitutionality of the War; they asserted that they had been injured
because of the increased danger of their being called to active duty which the War caused.
Thus, they claimed they had suffered "direct injury." In rejecting this contention, the
court stated that only a reservist ordered to Vietnam could meet the standing requirements, for only then would he be in immediate danger of suffering direct injury. Id. at
179. Cf. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968), where the court reached
the conclusion that a draftee who refused induction had standing to challenge the War's
constitutionality because of the direct relationship between the War's intensity and the
need for draftees. After according standing, however, the court ruled that the issue of
congressional approval of the War was "the essence of a political question." Id. at 515.
33. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had conducted the war without "either a declaration of war or an explicit, intentional, and discrete authorization," 488 F.2d
at 613 (apparently quoting from the plaintiff's complaint). Further, the plaintiffs sought
two types of relief: an injunction of the war unless within sixty days "Congress shall have
explicitly, intentionally and discretely authorized a continuation of the war"; and a declaratory judgment that the defendants were prosecuting the war in violation of U.S.CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11, Congress' power to "declare war," 488 F.2d at 613 (emphasis added)
(apparently quoting from the plaintiff's complaint).
34. The precise basis for plaintiffs' claim to standing is unclear, because of the
ambiguous nature of "plaintiff's constitutional right . . .to decide whether the United
States should fight a war," 488 F.2d at 613 (emphasis added) (apparently quoting from
the plaintiff's complaint). The complaint and the request for injunctive relief spoke in
terms of "declaration of war or an explicit, intentional and discrete authorization" of war;
see note 33 supra (emphasis added). Query, whether the "authorization" would be, on the
one hand, pursuant to Congress' power to declare war, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, or,
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ties in certain situations may be initiated by the President without prior congressional approval was offered as one effective answer to the plaintiffs' basis for standing. 5
The court found, however, its own basis for standiig. Applying the reasoning in Flast v. Cohen, the court explained that, if
it were to grant a declaratory judgment that the President had
exceeded his constitutional authority, one of the specific requests
for relief by the plaintiffs, such a judgement
would bear upon the duties of plaintiffs to consider whether
to impeach defendants, and upon plaintiffs' quite distinct
and different duties to make appropriations to support the
hostilities, or to take other legislative actions related to the
hostilities, such as raising
an army or enacting other civil or
3
criminal legislation. 1
The more important consideration in the standing issue appears
to be the duty to consider impeachment.37 Although the power to
appropriate funds and to enact legislation may encompass the
right to conduct a war, these powers seem to be a much less
38
substantial basis for standing.
Because the court did not base standing on direct injury,
the holding can only be justified by reliance on Flast v.
Cohen, which replaced the "direct injury" requirement with the
twin "nexus" test. Just as the Supreme Court in Flast ruled that
an act of Congress could be challenged by a taxpayer only if the
statute related to the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution, the court in Mitchell v. Laird held that a congressman could
on the other, pursuant to Congress' powers inter alia to collect taxes for the common
defense, to raise armies, and to provide a navy, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 1, 9 and 10.
In contrast, the prayer for declaratory judgment, which if granted would specify the
precise nature of the defendant's violation, was based solely on the power to declare war.
35. That is not an effective answer. There is no doubt that under certain circumstances, the President may engage the nation in hostilities without congressional approval; the
court cited invasion and surprise attack as examples. But, plaintiffs' contention was
simply that the Indo-China situation was not one in which the President had independent
authority and that therefore congressional approval was constitutionally required. The
court did not address itself further to plaintiffs' contention.
36. 488 F.2d at 614.
37. A declaration that the President had waged an unconstitutional war would affect
the House of Representatives in their consideration of whether such conduct was a high
crime or misdemeanor within the impeachment power. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. In its
discussion of the issue of mootness, the court also made this point. 488 F.2d at 614.
38. This is so because the plaintiffs' basis for standing is not clear and because the
court did not adequately explain the reason for its rejection of plaintiffs' ground. See notes
34-35 supra.
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challenge executive action only if it related to the congressional
power to consider impeachment. These two ideas seem consistent. Both the taxpayer and the congressmen had the type of
interest in the challenged actions which guaranteed "concrete
adversity."3
However, the decision in Mitchell v. Laird did not require the
plaintiffs to point to a specific constitutional restriction on the
President's power to act.' The second "nexus" requirement of
Flast v. Cohen, which was designed to sharpen the issues in difficult constitutional cases, was not satisfied." The Mitchell decision, therefore, broadened the concept of standing so that standing is accorded to congressmen in every dispute with the executive branch in which impeachment is a possible result.42
If the court in Mitchell v. Laird had accepted, as plaintiffs'
contention, that standing rested on the alleged denial of Congress' power to declare war, the issue would have been clearly
defined from the outset; unfortunately, the court left open the
possibility that any matter within a broad range of acts that could
result in impeachment of the President or his subordinates would
give a congressman standing to litigate. Thus, the court ignored
the very basis for the concept of standing.

LABOR RELATIONS-RIGHT OF

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

TO

STRIKE-STRIKE ENJOINED UNDER PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE UPON
FINDINGS OF JURISDICTION AND

THREAT-Philadelphia Federation

of Teachers v. Ross.'
The Philadelphia Federation of Teachers and the School
District of Philadelphia were unable to negotiate a contract for
the 1972-73 school year. As a consequence, the teachers failed to
report to work on September 5, 1972, the first day of the school
year.2 Negotiations did result in the teachers' returning to work
39.
40.
41.
42.
standing
Congress

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 106.
488 F.2d at 615.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 99.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this decision would allow individual congressmen
to challenge executive actions asserted to be unconstitutional or illegal when
as a body was unwilling to act.

1. 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 204, 301 A.2d 405 (1973).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (Supp. 1973) requires that disputes arising
during the negotiation of a contract must be submitted to mediation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
4:. § 1101.802 (Supp. 1973) permits the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board to appoint
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on September 28,1 but, after little progress was made toward a
new contract, the teachers voted on January 3, 1973, to strike the
following Monday, January 8. Subsequent to the vote, the School
District filed in the Court of Common Pleas on Thursday, January 4, 1973, a complaint pursuant to section 1101.1003 of the
Public Employe Relations Act 4 asking that the strike be enjoined.
After a hearing on Monday, January 8, at which time a strike was
in progress, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction and that
the strike created "a clear and present danger or threat to the
health, safety or welfare of the public." An injunction was, therefore, issued.
On an appeal filed by the Federation,5 the Commonwealth
a fact finding panel to make findings of facts and recommendations when mediation has
not produced an agreement. If the panel's recommendations are not accepted by the
parties to the dispute, the panel can publicize its findings. Strikes are prohibited during
the pendency of these collective bargaining procedures. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 1101.1002 (Supp. 1973). Although it is not clear whether these procedures were
followed by the parties in Philadelphia Federation prior to September 5, 1973, 8 Pa.
Cmwlth. at 207-08, 301 A.2d at 407, they apparently were, since the injunction action was
filed pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1973). This section requires
proceedings under sections 1101.801 and 1101.802 before an injunction will issue. See note
4 infra.
3. The teachers returned to work under a Memorandum of Understanding, which
was to expire on December 31, 1972. In the Memorandum, the teachers agreed to work
under the terms of the previous two year contract. The termination date of the Memorandum was later extended to January 7, 1973.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1973) (originally enacted as Public
Employe Relations Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, art. X, § 1003) provides:
If a strike by public employees occurs after the collective bargaining processes set
forth in sections 801 and 802 of Article VIII of this act have been completely utilized
and exhausted, it shall not be prohibited unless or until such a strike creates a clear
and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. In such
cases the public employer shall initiate, in the court of common pleas of the jurisdiction where such strike occurs, an action for equitable relief including but not
limited to appropriate injunctions and shall be entitled to such relief if the court
finds that the strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety
or welfare of the public.
Section 1101.1003 is only a small part of the Public Employe Relations Act, which is found
at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Supp. 1973). As to public employees covered
by the Act, the statute repealed the Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. No. 1183, which had
prohibited strikes by any public employees in Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.2201 (Supp. 1973). For a discussion of the Act'sapplication to teachers' strikes,
see Note, The Public Employe Relations Act and Pennsylvania Teachers: A Legal Analysis in Light of the January, 1971 Pittsburgh Dispute, 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 77 (1971-72).
Section 1101.1003 of the Public Employe Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as PERA)
is unusual in that it is one of the few existing right-to-strike enactments. See notes 35-36
and. 38.43 infra and accompanying text.
5. On appeal, the Federation apparently asserted that the lower court had no jurisdiction since there had been no strike when the complaint was filed and that the facts
had not reasonably shown that the strike had created "a clear and present danger or threat
to the health, safety or welfare of the public."
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Court of Pennsylvania-with two dissenting opinions-upheld
the issuance of the injunction. The appellate court, however,
departed from the lower court's jurisdictional, legal and factual
analysis. Three questions thus arise: first, whether either court
read the jurisdictional requirements of PERA correctly; second,
whether the phrase "clear and present danger or threat to the
health, safety or welfare of the public" has been construed by
either court as the legislature intended; and, third, whether the
facts reasonably support the issuance of the injunction.
Since Pennsylvania, formerly by its Constitution' and presently by statute,7 limits the equity jurisdiction of the court of
common pleas to those areas specified by legislation, the equity
court could only have enjoined the strike if the requirements of
PERA had been met. Acknowledging that the occurrence of a
strike' is "the condition of the statute upon which the court's
jurisdiction is predicated," 9 the Commonwealth Court held that
the strike had in fact occurred on September 5, because the strike
Both the majority and Judge Blatt, dissenting, criticized the Federation for violating
the injunction by remaining on strike while the appeal was taken. Normally, as the court
pointed out, it would have refused to hear the appellant's case, apparently under the clean
hands doctrine, but it agreed to render a decision since the public interest was involved.
8 Pa. Cmwlth. at 216 n.2, 301 A.2d at 411 n.2. It can be assumed that the strike was
continuing at the time of the decision. Otherwise, mootness would have rendered the
decision unnecessary.
6. PA. CONST. art. V, § 20, prior to 1968 limited the equity jurisdiction of the court
of common pleas to areas specified by legislation. In 1968, however, this provision was
repealed and replaced by PA. CONST. art. V, § 5, which grants to courts of common pleas
"unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law."
Thus. absent statutory limitation, courts of common pleas are no longer limited in their
jurisdictional authority; however, statutes have been enacted to limit their jurisdiction.
See note 7 infra.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 281 (1970) provides that the courts of common pleas
shall have equity jurisdiction only in certain specified areas (such as control over trusts)
"[and in such other cases as the said courts have heretofore possessed such jurisdiction
and powers, under the Constitution and laws of this Commonwealth." Consequently, the
court of common pleas would have been without jurisdiction in the present case absent
PERA's specific grant of jurisdiction. See Armstrong School Dist. v. Armstrong Educ.
Ass'n, 5 Pa. Cmwlth. 387, 291 A.2d 125 (1972) for a general discussion of the limited
jurisdiction of equity courts. Therein Judge Blatt specifically found that the grant of
equity jurisdiction to the court of common pleas in PERA only empowers the court to end
a strike; the court cannot compel arbitration or a settlement. Judge Blatt's dissent in
Philadelphia Federation further illustrates the view that equity's jurisdiction is to be
strictly limited.
8. The language of the statute clearly requires the occurrence of a strike to confer
jurisdiction: "If a strike ...

occurs . . . it shall not be prohibited unless or until such a

strike creates a . . .danger or threat .... " Reference to the "court of common pleas of
the jurisdiction where such strike occurs" supports the requirement. See note 4 supra for
the complete text of the statute.
9. 8 Pa. Cmwlth. at 208, 301 A.2d at 407.
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was merely suspended, and not terminated, on September 28,
when the teachers returned to work under the Memorandum of
Understanding; thus, the strike continued to occur on January 4
and thereafter. By holding that the strike had occurred long before January 4, the majority rectified several problems inherent
in the lower court's exercise of jurisdiction.
The lower court's holding on the jurisdictional question is not
clear. Because the School District filed a complaint seeking an
injunction on January 4, the Federation asserted that the lower
court was without jurisdiction since no strike was in progress on
that date. The lower court sustained the Federation's assertion
"to the extent it deals with the jurisdiction of the court . . . to
grant an injunction before a strike actually occurs."'" However,
the court issued the injunction on January 8, at which time the
strike was in progress. From these facts there are two possible
interpretations. First, the lower court may have meant that while
it could not grant equitable relief until a strike had actually occurred, it could exercise jurisdiction to entertaina complaint filed
in equity before a strike was in progress." Alternately, as Judge
Blatt in his dissent concluded, 2 the lower court may have thought
that equity jurisdiction could be retained until such time that a
strike actually occurred even though there was no strike or no
proper jurisdiction at the time the complaint was filed.
Undoubtedly, the Commonwealth Court realized that either
theory would set a dangerous precedent. A public employer could
file a complaint for an injunction whenever public employees
were scheduled to strike sometime in the future. Under the first
possible holding, the court could hear evidence and be ready to
rule immediately upon the occurrence of the strike. Under the
second possible holding, the court could retain jurisdiction and
begin a hearing immediately upon the occurrence of the strike
without the court's requiring the employer to file another com10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. The majority implied that this was the lower court's holding. Id. By holding that
the strike occurred in September, the majority did not have to assess directly the validity
of this position. However, the majority did, in order to prevent confusion, imply that the
lower court was in error:
Such a strike having occurred, . . .jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in equitv properly attached. That the Court could not then grant the equitable relief
provided by the statute until hearing and proof of a clear and present danger or
threat to public health, welfare or safety in no way diminishes or further conditions
the statutory grant. to entertain such an equitable action.
Id. at 210, 301 A.2d at 408.
12. Id. at 218, 301 A.2d at 412-13.
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plaint. Both of these approaches would not only violate Pennsylvania's rule of equity that jurisdiction must be determined by the
facts and circumstances appearing on the face of the complaint,,3
but they would also vitiate PERA, which clearly requires the
"occurrence" of a strike. Both theories would be especially troublesome in situations where the strike was to begin well into the
future; the employees' actions and decisions would be influenced
by the existence of jurisdiction in the courts.'4 Of course, the lower
court probably realized that the School District merely would
have filed a second complaint on January 8 if the first complaint
had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, convenience and expediency should not justify deviation from the rules
of equity jurisdiction and from the provisions of PERA.'5
Equally troublesome, however, is the interpretation given by
the majority of the Commonwealth Court to the jurisdictional
requirements of PERA. Under the facts in this case, it is perhaps
plausible to conclude that there was one continuous strike, i.e.,
that the strike of January 4 had in fact occurred previously on
September 5 and was merely suspended on September 28, since
the teachers returned to work under a Memorandum of Understanding on that date rather than under a new contract. Still, a
court, by disregarding the precise facts, could extend this holding
to conclude that whenever a strike by public employees has occurred the threat of another strike by the same public employees
is merely a continuation of a former strike. Courts must be careful
to enter into an exhaustive factual analysis in order to determine
whether there has in fact been one continuous strike or two inde13. See, e.g., Lafean v. American Caramel Co., 271 Pa. 276, 282, 114 A. 622, 624
(1921) (Because fraud and collusion were averred in the complaint against a corporation
which was contractually bound to acquire stock, plant, the business and an employee of
another corporation, equity jurisdiction was proper since it was "determined from the face
of the bill and on conditions existing when it was filed."); Brenner v. Sukenik, 410 Pa.
324. 189 A.2d 246 (196:3) (In the absence of an allegation in the complaint that the husband
was separated from his wife or had deserted her, the court of common pleas lacked
jurisdiction to entertain an action for support.).
14. The work stoppage in Philadelphia Federationbegan only a few days after the
vote to strike. Query, if'the actual work stoppage was not to begin so soon, whether the
court might have refused to retain jurisdiction.
15. As Judge Blatt, dissenting, quoted:
"No emergency, real or feared, and no alleged hardship to a complaining party,
however great, can justify a court's entertaining and passing upon a subject matter
which is not within the jurisdictional competence." Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 396 Pa. 34, 38, 152 A.2d 422, 424
(1959).
8 Pa. Cmwlth. at 221, :301 A.2d at 413.

516

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

XXXIII

pendent strikes.' 8 PhiladelphiaFederationshould have mandated
this type of factual analysis. Without the analysis, strikes by
public employees under the majority's bare conclusion may be
enjoinable whenever the same employees have previously been on
strike. It is unlikely that the legislature intended such an interpretation of PERA.'I
The dissents of both Judge Crumlish and Judge Blatt present
the most tenable position. In disagreeing with the approaches of
both the lower court and the appellate court majority, the dissents defined a strike as a "work stoppage." Since the teachers
were on the job on January 4, no strike had occurred as of that
date, and no equity jurisdiction was present. This view not only
represents the prevailing Pennsylvania definition of "strike"' but
also, and more importantly, conforms with PERA's definition of
"strike."'" Therefore, the legislature must have intended, as the
dissents concluded, that there can be no equity jurisdiction until
such time as the public employees were actually off the job. Until
that time a complaint must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Having found jurisdiction, the majority also upheld the lower
court's determination that the strike created "a clear and present
danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public"
16. The previous work stoppage by the teachers in Philadelphia Federation had
occurred earlier in the school year. Query whether a strike in a subsequent school year
might have been considered by the majority as a continuation of the previous strike.
17. Had the legislature intended to limit the number of times that a group of public
employees could strike during a given period of time, such specific language would have
been included in the statute. See generally Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United
States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
18. Pennsylvania cases define "strike" as "a concerted refusal by employees to do
any work for their employer . . . until the object of the strike is attained, that is until
the employer grants the concession demanded." Glen Alden Corp. v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 189 Pa. Super. 286, 291, 150 A.2d 591, 594 (1959) (Using
the Restatement's definition of strike, the court held that an employee is not entitled to
unemployment compensation when the employee is on strike.). Accord, Adley Express Co.
v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107, 349 F. Supp. 436, 441-442 (E.D. Pa. 1959)
(The union's conduct constituted a strike in violation of the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement.).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(9) provides that
"strike" means concerted action in failing to report.for duty, the willful absence
from one's position, the stoppage of work, slowdown, or the abstinence in whole or
in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment
for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the conditions or
compensation or the rights, privileges, or obligations of employment.
Both the majority and the dissents failed to cite the statute's definition of "strike." Judge
Crumlish utilized Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, and Judge Blatt cited
prevailing case law. The majority, as well as the lower court, failed to define the term.
The lower court may have considered a strike as work stoppage since it refused on January
5 to enjoin the strike prospectively.
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which justified the issuance of the injunction under PERA.2 °
Again, however, the majority diverted from the lower court's legal
and factual analysis. The Commonwealth Court, unlike the lower
court, concluded that the phrase "clear and present danger or

threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public" contains two
separate criteria for judicial action. Acknowledging that the first
criterion, "clear and present danger," was applied by the lower
court, the Commonwealth Court emphasized that "the alternate
criterion for judicial action cannot be ignored - the creation of
a 'threat to the public health, safety or welfare.' "2 "Threat" was
then defined by the majority as "an indication or warning of
2 2 and as an "indication of impending danger
probable 'trouble"
23
or harm.

Applying the legal criteria to the facts, the Commonwealth
Court seemingly conceded that the strike created no "clear and
present danger" on January 8. On that date, however, the court
did find a "threat to the public health, safety or welfare." Impending harm was indicated, said the court, not only by the "possibility" of increased gang activity and the loss of state aid, which

would affect the public directly, but also by the potential impact
on the school population which would indirectly affect the public
at large. Loss of instructional days could lower educational standards and specifically could hinder seniors with regard to college
entrance qualifications. After emphasizing that no one of these
factors necessarily constituted a threat and particularizing that
no special rule for Philadelphia was being formulated, the appellate court, as a matter of law, concluded that such facts did
establish "a threat to the health, welfare or safety of the public." 4
20. 8 Pa. Cmwlth. at 215, 301 A.2d at 409. The court also discussed the scope of
appellate review of facts found to exist by the lower court. Citing basic authority, the court
concluded:
Given sufficient evidence which justifies the findings and logically sound, reasonable inference and conclusions derived therefrom, the Chancellor's decision will
stand. Even a preponderance of testimony against the findings will be insufficient
if there is testimony which, if believed, will warrant them ....
In summary, there
must have been apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the lower court.
id. at 215-16, 301 A.2d at 410. The dissents agreed with this position. This limited scope
of appellate review was noted in a prior case interpreting PERA, Armstrong School Dist.
v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 5 Pa. Cmwlth. 387, 291 A.2d 120 (1972).
21. 8 Pa. Cmwlth. at 214, 301 A.2d at 410.
22. Id., citing the Random House Dictionary of the English Language (College Edition, 1969).
23. Id., citing the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1970).
24. The appellate court indicated that it was unnecessary to consider whether the
lower court was correct in "centerlingl its concern upon the school pupils themselves as
a segment of the public entitled to the statute's protection absent proof of clear and
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Therefore, reasonable grounds existed for the issuance of the injunction.
In its discussion of "threat," the Commonwealth Court
acknowledged its earlier holding in Armstrong School District v.
Armstrong Education Association."' In Armstrong, an injunction
under PERA had been issued to halt a teachers' strike. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed and held that the strike
could not be enjoined since the strike did not create "a clear and
present danger or threat." The Commonwealth Court in
Armstrong recognized that, when the legislature granted public
employees the right to strike so long as no "clear and present
danger or threat" existed, the legislature intended the danger or
threat to entail more than those dangers or threats which are
"normally incident to a strike by public employees." 6 Otherwise
there would be no right to strike. The legislature intended to
permit certain inevitable inconveniences. Thus, concluded the
Armstrong court, while disruption of administrative procedures,
the harassment of the School Board directors, and community
unrest resulting from the teachers' strike were "clear and present," they were not "dangers or threats" within the meaning of
PERA. The evidence, in addition, had not shown that the teachers themselves were directly responsible for the actions, and, consequently, community unrest caused by outsiders should not be
a basis for an injunction. As a contradistinction, the danger that
the District might lose state subsidies because of a loss of school
days, although a danger or threat, was not "present" since the
strike had only been in existence for twelve days and there were
thirty-nine days in which to make up the lost time. The fact that
teachers and students would have to remain in school later in
June was merely one of the inconveniences inherent in the right
present danger or threat . . . to the public at large." 8 Pa. Cmwlth. at 214, 301 A.2d at
410. Since the lower court had also found facts which would reasonably indicate that there
was a threat to the public at large, an injunction could be issued. The majority stated:
When increased gang activity is threatened, when an additional $133,000 per day
is expended by the city for additional police protection and when the financial aid
to a debt -ridden school district is in jeopardy even though its loss is not a present
reality, all these are ramifications which affect virtually all segments of the public.
Id.
25. 5 Pa. Cmwlth. 378, 291 A.2d 120 (1972). The strike of the 550 teachers in
Armstrong began on August 30, 1971. On September 1, the lower court denied a request
for an injunction on the ground that the request was premature. On September 14, however. upon a showing of a clear and present danger or threat, the lower court granted the
injunction. There was no question in Armstrong concerning jurisdiction, since the teachers
were actually on strike when the injunction was first sought.
26. Id. at 336, 291 A.2d at 124.
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to strike. 7
The majority in Philadelphia Federation interpreted
Armstrong solely as standing for the proposition that a strike is
not enjoinable, under PERA, until "a clear and present danger"
exists. To support this conclusion and the concomitant proposition that Armstrong disregarded the threat criteria, the majority
quoted from Armstrong:
"[T]he legislature may be understood to have indicated its
willingness to accept certain inconveniences, for such are
inevitable, but it obviously intended to draw the line at those
[strikes] which pose a danger to the public health, safety
or welfare." 5 Pa. Cmwlth. at 384, 291 A.2d at 124.28
The majority, in distinguishing Armstrong with respect to the
legal standard, could consider their case as the first to interpret
the meaning of the statutory language "threat to the health,
safety or welfare of the public." The majority could then freely
and without restraint define the legal standard for "threat" and
enjoin the instant strike. The court need not distinguish
Armstrong on the facts or restrict Armstrong's application to
27. In deciding that the strike did not constitute a "clear and present danger or
threat." the Armstrong court stated: "The phrase has almost invariably been used heretofore in cases involving government interference with first amendment rights." The court
cited Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949); and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The court then concluded
that the most applicable definition of "clear and present" was stated in Communist Party
of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 96 U.S. App. D.C. 66, 223 F.2d
5t1 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956):
IT'Ihe "clear" in that epigram is not limited to a threat indubitably etched in every
microscopic detail. It. includes that which is not speculative but real, not imagined
but actual. The "present" in the epigram is not restricted to the climatically imminent. It includes that which exists as contrasted with that which does not yet exist
and that which has ceased to exist.
22:3 F.2d at 544.
Hazelton Area School Dist. v. Educational Ass'n, 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 639, 61 Luz. L.
Reg. 233 (1971), substantiates Armstrong's position on the legislature's intent. In
Hoze'ton. the lower court refused to enjoin a strike by teachers on its second day even
though the school district cited seventeen adverse effects of the strike including the possible loss of state subsidies, extension of the school year into June, and a disruptive effect
on extracurricular affairs. Recognizing that the seventeen effects would result in an
inadequate educational program, the court nevertheless emphasized that the legislature
"must have intended the Court to use some standard other than the above items to define
health, safety or welfare of the public." Id. at 643, 61 Luz. L. Reg. at 235. To grant an
injunction because of inconveniences "automatically every time the teachers struck . . .
would mean the legislature granting the right to teachers to strike with one hand and
taking it away with the other, which is tantamount to no legislation at all." Id. at 644, 61
luz. L. Reg. at 235.
28. 8 Pa. Cmwlth. at 214, 301 A.2d at 410 (emphasis added).
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rural areas. In addition, the court could read out of the threat
criteria Armstrong's point that the legislature intended certain
inevitable inconveniences and could also delete the "clear and
present" standard from the threat criteria. Upon finding that the
several possible impending harms connoted a threat, the court
could enjoin the strike.
Armstrong, however, cannot be so easily disregarded. The
excerpt used by the majority to justify their interpretation of
Armstrong is not indicative of the entire opinion. A broad reading
of Armstrong indicates that Judge Blatt used the words "threat"
and "danger" interchangeably, although he used "threat" much
less frequently than "danger." It is questionable, therefore,
whether Judge Blatt even considered that the two words created
two different criteria by which to enjoin a strike. 9 Further, in his
dissent in PhiladelphiaFederation,Judge Blatt still did not draw
any distinction. If this interchangeability is the proper reading of
Armstrong-even though the interchangeable use of "danger"
and "threat" may have been inadvertent-the majority erroneously distinguished Armstrong as a "danger" case and should
have more carefully analyzed the difference in the meanings of
the words "threat" and "danger" and the differences in the facts
of the two cases.
Moreover, regardless of whether Judge Blatt did in fact acknowledge in Armstrong the "threat" criteria, he clearly imposed
a much stricter standard for finding a "danger" or "threat" than
the majority's standard of the totality of the possible harms:
In this light, the determination of whether or not a strike
presents a clear and present danger to the health, safety or
welfare of the public must, therefore, require the court to
find that the danger or threat is real or actual and that a
strong likelihood exists that it will occur. Additionally, it
seems to us that the "danger" or "threat" concerned must
not be one which is normally incident to a strike by public
employees."
One possible reading of this passage is that there are two elements
in this standard: the danger or threat must be real or actual and
29. It is plausible, however, that Judge Blatt did recognize the difference but believed that the standards to be applied to each in order to enjoin the strike were the same.
Additionally, in PhiladelphiaFederationas in Armstrong Judge Blatt implied that "clear
and present" should be the standard applied to each word.
30. Armstrong School Dist. v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 5 Pa. Cmwlth. 378, 383-84,
291 A.2d 120, 124 (emphasis added).
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there must be "a strong likelihood . . . that it [danger?] will
occur." A logical construction is that "strong likelihood" is synonymous with "threat" and "it" refers to "danger." If there is no
present danger, the employer must present proof that the threat
will almost certainly ripen into a danger. If, under this interpretation, Judge Blatt recognized a difference between "threat" and
"danger" the difference is indeed small.'
In his dissent in PhiladelphiaFederation, Judge Blatt did
not develop his "strong likelihood" approach to the problem, perhaps because by his interpretation of the facts in Philadelphia
Federationthere was no proof of a "strong likelihood" that danger
would develop. As Judge Blatt saw it, the teachers had been on
strike for only one day when the hearing was held and only four
days when the injunction was issued.2 Almost by definition, a
danger or threat could not become clear and present in so short a
time.
Arguably, Judge Blatt's view of the facts was erroneous. That
there would be increased gang activity in Philadelphia resulting
in $133,000 per day in additional police protection might indicate
"a strong likelihood" that a danger will occur. Moreover, the
strike might have continued for so long that the "threat" of loss
of state subsidies because of a loss of instructional days would
become a "present danger." The grievances between the Federation and the School District had been unsettled after at least six
months of negotiations; at the time of the filing of the complaint
the grievances were likely to remain unsettled in the future. In
March when the case was heard, the grievances had still not been
settled.33 Yet, when the teachers voted to strike, and actually did
walk off the job, in Judge Blatt's opinion there was no "clear and
present danger or threat."
Criticism of Judge Blatt's view of the facts, however, depends upon hindsight. In his dissent Judge Blatt concluded that
the evidence offered by the School District was only an estimate
:31. "Present danger" and "strong likelihood" of present danger may be grounds for
an injunction. Reasonable expectancy would not be a ground, as Judge Blatt made clear
at the end of his Armstrong opinion:
We must hold, however, that the proper purpose of an injunction under Act No.
195 I PERAI is to avert present danger, not to prevent danger which may never
occur at all or which can only occur, if it does occur, at some future time before
which the grievances concerned can reasonably be expected to be settled.
Id. at 387, 291 A.2d at 125.
:12. This interpretation is logically consistent with his views on jurisdiction. See text
accompanying notes 18 and 19 supra.
33. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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of the potential danger or threat. Further, the inability of the
teachers in PhiladelphiaFederationto obtain a contract for a long
period of time paralleled that of the teachers in Armstrong.
The interpretation given to the phrase "clear and present
danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public" by
the majority in the present case appears to limit severely the
public employees' right to strike granted by the legislature. That
there should be two alternate criteria is palatable; nevertheless,
it should also be concluded that the legislature, by including the
word "threat," intended to allow injunctions once a work stoppage had occurred only if the public employer could show with
data that danger and not inconvenience was clearly inevitable at
some designated point in time even though such danger had not
yet become a reality. Unfortunately, PhiladelphiaFederation
merely sets the standard for finding a threat in terms of possibilities. There seems to be no requirement that the employer present
exacting evidence to substantiate the charges or to measure their
effect. There is no time element by which to judge when the
possibilities might actually become harmful. There is no guidance for future decisions.
By formulating lenient tests for finding the occurrence of a
strike and a "clear and present danger of threat to the health,
safety or welfare of the public," the majority in Philadelphia
Teachers appears to be disregarding the statements in the prior
cases that the right to strike is important, that it should be protected, and that the legislature intended to permit certain inconveniences which accompany a strike by public employees. This
repudiation may be due to the fact that a large urban area was
involved in the present case; arguably, the strike created a much
greater impact on the public than in the previous two cases, both
of which involved less urbanized areas.34 The logical conclusion,
therefore, is that future strikes by public employees, especially in
large urban areas, will likely be tolerated only for a short time, if
at all, despite the statutory right to strike.
As a practical matter, however, the majority in Philadelphia
Federation had little choice but to decide the case as they did. A
conclusion that the court of common pleas was without jurisdiction and that the threat or danger was not sufficiently clear would
'34. In relative terms, however, a strike in a rural area is just as costly and disruptive
to that rural area as a strike in the city is costly and disruptive to the city. Also, the basic
effects f the strikes heretofore mentioned were the same, i.e., loss of state subsidies,
extension of' the school year into the summer, and disruption of the school and the
community.
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have entailed dismissal of the complaint and would have required
the filing of a new complaint by the School District. Since, at the
time of the decision by the Commonwealth Court on March 13,
1973, the Federation was apparently still on' strike, there must
have been little doubt in the minds of the court members that
much judicial time could be saved by merely affirming the lower
court ruling.
The right to strike existing in Pennsylvania and the court's
interpretation of the statute granting that qualified right must be
viewed in light of the prohibition of any strikes by public employees under the common law and statutory law of almost all states,
as well as under the federal law. 3 Nevertheless, the increasing
occurrence of illegal public employee strikes36 has caused some
writers to assert that public employees-other than those employees whose jobs directly affect the public's safety, such as
7
policemen and firemen-should be granted the right to strike.
35. Maryland, by common law, prohibits strikes by public employees. Bennett v.
Gravelle, :12:1 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971). By statute Maryland specifically prohibits
strikes by teachers. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160(i) (1969). See also 5 U.S.C. § 7311
(1970) (prohibiting federal employees not only from striking but also from advocating a
strike); DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1312 (Cum. Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221
(1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1301 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 964(2)(c) (Cum.
Supp. 197:1); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178F (Cum. Supp. 1972); Micti. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 42:1.201 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64 (Cum. Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 105.530 (1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-821 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.230 (1967);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:6 (Cum.Supp. 1972); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Page 1965); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11,§ 548.14
(Cum. Supp. 1973) (applies only to firefighters and police); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.760
(1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-6 (1970); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 64(b) (Supp.
1972): VA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-55 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.120 (1972); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 111.70(4)(1) (Cum.Supp. 1973). See also, Note, Right of Public Employees to
Strike. 16 DEPAuL L. REV. 151 (1971); Note, Striking A Balance in BargainingWith Public
'cMo(l Teachers, 56 IOWA L. REV. 598 (1971); Note, Relations in Public Employment-Can
(;,uerament (overn Itself?, 29 MD. L. REV. 40 (1969). Leading cases stating that the
common law prohibits public employees from striking include United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn.
269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); and Los Angeles Met. Tran. Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R.
Traipmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 355 P.2d 905 (1961).
In School Dist. For the City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157
N.W.2d 206 (1968), the Michigan Supreme Court held that, despite a statute making
public employee strikes illegal, a teachers' strike was not enjoinable since it had not been
shown that the strike would cause any "violence, irreparable injury, or breach of the
peace." A mere showing of a "concert of prohibited actions" is not enough to justify
injunctive relief. The court stated that it was "basically contrary to public policy in this
State to issue injunctions in labor disputes" unless something more than the normal
shutdown of the schools would result. This case appears to stand alone in so holding.
:36.In 1969, there were 414 illegal strikes involving 161,000 public employees. Comment. Public Employees, No Right to Strike, 38 TENN. L. REV. 403 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Note, Right of Public Employees to Strike, 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 151
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In addition, at least three jurisdictions-Hawaii," Alaska,3" and
Vermont "--have recently enacted legislation permitting public
employees to strike.
Under the Alaska statute the right to strike is dependent on
the duties the public employees perform. Police, fire protection,
jail and hospital employees are prohibited from striking; public
utility, sanitation and school employees can strike but only after
mediation and only for a limited time, which is determined in the
interest of the health, safety or welfare of the public; other employees can strike at will. As to strikes by the second class of
employees, injunctions can issue but only after a showing that the
strike has "begun to threaten the health, safety or welfare of the
public and after the impact on the public has been weighed
against the extent to which the employees and the employers
have fulfilled the obligations of the statute."4 '
The language of the Alaska statute, therefore, appears to be
most similar to that of the Pennsylvania statute. The Hawaii and
Vermont statutes, however, are different. Because both seemingly permit an injunction to issue prior to an actual work stoppage, the jurisdictional problem which confronted the Commonwealth Court in Philadelphia Federation would not arise.42 In
addition, the Hawaii statute provides for a public employment
relations board consisting of three members, one member representing respectively management, labor and the public, to
mediate differences between public employees and the public
employers. Further, since the board, rather than the public employer, files suit for an injunction, 3 the Hawaii statute offers a
(1967): Note. Striking a Balance in Bargaining With Public School Teachers, 56 IOWA L.
REv. 598 (1971).
:38. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (1970).
39. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972).
40. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1973). There have been no cases as yet interpreting the Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont statutes.
41. ALASKA STAT. § 2;3.40.200 (1972). It should be noted that PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.1004 (Supp. 1973) states that an unfair practice by a public employer cannot be
used as a defense to a prohibited strike.
42. The Vermont Municipal Labor Relations Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730
197:) states among other requirements that "a strike shall not be prohibited unless...
lilt will endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the public." An injunction can issue if
a strike in violation of the statute is occurring or about to occur. The Hawaii statute also
refers to a strike which is occurring or about to occur. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12(c) and
(e) (1970). See note 4:3infra.
4:.
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12(c) (1970) provides:
Where the strike occurring, or is about to occur, endangers the public health or
safety, the public employer concerned may petition the board to make an investigation. If the board finds that there is imminent or present danger to the health and
safety of the public, the board shall set requirements that must be complied with
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contrasting procedure to that of the other states, Pennsylvania,
Alaska, and Vermont.
PhiladelphiaFederationis particularly important, therefore,
in that it may well be used by those advocating a right to strike
statute elsewhere to show that the courts can limit strikes even
under a right to strike statute. In addition, the case may be useful
to show that the granting of a qualified right to strike to public
employees by statute is not the complete answer to the problem
of limiting such strikes so as to prevent "clear and present dangers or threats" to the public."
to avoid any such imminent or present danger.
Upon violation of this section the board pursuant to section 89-12(e) can seek an injunction.
44. In Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n, 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 210, 304 A.2d 922 (1973), a strike
by the Education Association was not enjoined because the strike did not constitute a
danger to the health, safety and welfare of the public. Emphasizing Armstrong rather than
Philadelphia Federation, the court stressed that the strike was not violent, that loss of
school days could be recovered in the summer and that loss of a quality assessment
program did not outweigh the right to strike. Also discussed by the court are sections
1101.801 and 1101.802. See note 2 supra. It is not clear, however, whether the case was
filed pursuant to section 1101.1003, the section pertinent in Armstrong and Philadelphia
Federation.

